A Local Distinction: State Education Privacy Laws for Public Schoolchildren by Stuart, Susan P.
Valparaiso University
ValpoScholar
Law Faculty Publications Law Faculty Presentations and Publications
2006
A Local Distinction: State Education Privacy Laws
for Public Schoolchildren
Susan P. Stuart
Valparaiso University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Education Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff
member at scholar@valpo.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan P. Stuart, A Local Distinction: State Education Privacy Laws for Public Schoolchildren, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. 361 (2006).
A LOCAL DISTINCTIO.N1: STATE EDUCATION 
PRIVACY LAWS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLCHILDREN 
.. Susan P. Stuart 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 361 
II. BACKGRQUND ........•.•..........•.•.. ..•... ~·••·•••••••••·• ·•"!oo••••••••••··••·• ·•=•• ·••••••••·•••••••••••••363 
lll. STATE CONSTITUTIONS: PRIVACY AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ............ 365 
A. Explicit Constitutional Privacy Rights .................................... 365 
B. Implicit Constitutional Privacy Rights .......................... ......... 372 
IV. PRIVACY STATUTES & REGULATIONS PROTECTING STUDENT 
REcoRDS ........... ...................... ................. .... ....... ·=· ., •••.... ..•••.. ·=· ·=· .... ......... ·=··· ..•.. ..••..•...•. 3 77 
A. Mini-FERPAs: Statutes & Reg.ulations .................................. 377 
B. Access Only Statutes .......... ~··················~-~································383 
C. Special Education Records ...................................................... 384 
D. Reaping the Whirlwind: Enforcing Statutory Rights ............. 385 
V. SUNSHINE LAWS PROTECTING STUDENT RECORDS .................. !' •••••••• ~387 
• A. The Protection ........................................................................ 387 
B. The Litigation .. ., ................................ ......... ;; .. ·=· ·=· .... ....••• ·=··· .. , .••.•••.....• ~. t ••.• 3·92 
VI. CONCLUSION . ................................. ............. ............................................. 394 
.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
If the old maxim is true, that "all politics is local," then even more so is 
the principle true that all public education is loca1.2 Recent case law develop-
ments also suggest that plaintiffs who are unhappy about a problem in education 
• 
are increasingly seeking relief from local legal resources, such as going to state 
court to litigate state law matters, 3 rather than seeking relief under federal law. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A. DePauw Univer-
sity; M.Ed. Valparaiso University; J.D. Indiana University Indianapolis. I extend my many 
thanks to my research assistants who kept all these statutes straight and up-to-date: Katherine 
Lord, Lori Marschke, and Chuck Waller. 
I 
"Our citizenship in the United States is our national character. Our citizenship in any par-
ticular state is only our local distinction. By the latter we are known at home, by the fonner to the 
world." Thomas Paine, The Last Crisis (April 19, 1783), in THE SELECI'ED WORK OF TOM PAINE 
86 (Howard Fasted., Duell, Sloan & Pearce 1945) (emphasis added). 
2 
"By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local 
authorities." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,104 (1968); Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
3 One of the starkest examples of the switch from the relative toothlessness of federal litiga-
tion to the power of the "local option" of state litigation is in school funding equity cases. After 
plaintiffs failed to receive relief from Texas's state and local funding legislation in federal court 
and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in San Antonio Independent 
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A similar trend is increasingly apparent in privacy cases: State constitutions are 
becoming the refuge for privacy protection if the federal courts are viewed as 
sidestepping the issue, at least in matters of Fourth Amendment search and sei-
zure jurisprudence and of decisional privacy.4 Such a development is also in-
creasingly likely in the confluence of education and privacy problems in matters 
of education informational privacy, especially privacy of student records. Plain-
tiffs will abandon litigation under federal laws because those laws are ineffec-
tive and instead will enforce their privacy rights under state law~ 
State privacy laws have proved more effective at protecting privacy for 
at least three reasons. First, they typically create an affirmative right to privacy. 
Next, states are more willing to vociferously protect their citizens' privacy 
rights. Last, these statutes are more likely to be privately enforceable by indi-
viduals. Thus, school districts have more to fear from state privacy laws and 
the growing trend toward state litigation than they do from federal laws. Hence, 
. . 
this Article will attempt to examine major areas of state privacy law - constitu-
tions, statutes, and regulations - to which school districts must be attentive 
when dealing with student records.5 
Part II will review the backdrop for plaintiffs' abandoning federal laws 
for state law protections over student record privacy. Part m will examine state 
constitutional privacy provisions, where states have made privacy a fundamental 
right. Part N will take up specifically dedicated state statutes and regulations 
that provide privacy protection to student records. Last, Part V will deal with 
exemptions in state sunshine laws that protect student record privacy. This Ar-
ticle is designed to educate about this little known but increasingly important 
niche in privacy protection for the records of public schoolchildren,6 and to alert 
school districts that observing federal privacy laws may no longer be enough 
protection from litigation .. 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),. they were measurably more successful in attack~ 
ing the same legislation in the Texas. state court and under the. Texas Constitution in Edgewood 
Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). See also Ken Gormley, One 
Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1335, 1420-1422 (1992) [hereinafter Gonnley; 100 
Years]. 
4 See Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy &: the States, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1279, 
1280 (1992); Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3, at 1423-25. 
5 
·There is, unfortunately, little way that an Article such as this can address all the individual 
state privacy laws that might protect student records. As soon as this piece is published, some 
state will amend its statutes or enact a new one. However, this Anicle observes trends and warns 
about general categories of concern. This Article will also not address the privacy issues raised by 
the various states' military access statutes that require schools to give personal information to 
military recruiters. As of the writing of this Article, those statutes may be subject to challenge 
pending the Supreme Court's decision on the federal version of the military access statute in F o-
rumjor Academic & Institutional Rights v . . Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cen. granted, 
125 S. Ct. t 977 (2005). 
6 This Article is limited to the student records of K-12 public school students although higher 
education privacy protections may be addressed tangentially and as exemplars when K-12 analo-
gies and. cases are absent. 
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IT. BACKGROUND 
Until recently, school districts and other authorities considered federal 
law the primary source of protection for the privacy of public school records. 
O.ne such source of solace was the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.7 
A statute ostensibly enacted to protect student and family privacy in public 
school records, FERPA provides proce,dures for the limited disclosure of and 
access to "education records,"8 Any school district with a·policy or practice of 
defying these procedures may lose its federal · funding. 9 Although there was 
some debate, whether FERPA was actually a privacy statute or merely a funding 
statute, 10 Gonzaga University v. Doe11 rendered that distinction virtually moot 
for an individual's, privacy right~ In that case, the Supreme Court of the United 
States determined that FERP A provides no personal rights to persons seeking to 
enforce the privacy "promised'' by the statute.12 As a consequence, children 
(and their parents) who believe their privacy has been compromised by noncon-
sensual disclosure of or access to their student records will search for alternative 
recourse for protection.. State laws are the likely candidates for that recourse~ 
Gonzaga University v. Doe is instructive in this manner because plain-
tiff Do,e - although unsuccessful on his, FERP,A claim - did prevail on his state 
law claim for the common law tort of invasion of privacy. 13 So too might other 
individuals who alternatively plead state law claims when seeking a remedy for 
a breach of privacy occasioned by an unlawful disclosure of student records. 
Indeed, some of these state law claims could provide more than just minimal 
injunctive relief; plaintiff Doe was awarded over $100,000 for invasion of pri-
vacy!4 
However, this Article is not exclusively about litigation; it is also about 
compliance with the law. The general privacy resource that school districts re-
7 
8 
9 
20 U.S.C. § I232g (2000)., 
Id. § 1232g(a)(4). 
/d. § 1232g(b )(I). 
1° Compare Unincorporated Operating Div. oflnd. Newspapers, Inc. v. Trs. oflnd. Univ., 787 
N.E.2d 893, 903-04 (Ind. Ct. Ap,p. 2003) (FERPA requires that student records be kept confiden-
tial) with Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 427 S.E~2d 257, 261 (Ga. 1993) (FERPA 
does not prohibit disclosure of student records; it only regulates funding based on policies of 
releasing student records). 
11 536 u.s. 273 (2002). 
12 ld. at 287., 
13 Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390 (2001), rev'din part, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
14 Id. Doe prevailed on his invasion of privacy claim regarding the internal investigation of 
his alleged misconduct that eventually led Gonzaga University to refuse to give the moral charac-
ter affidavit Doe needed to obtain his teaching certification. ld. at 399-400. This particular type 
of invasion of privacy is not one that a student might traditionally pursue for unlawful disclosure 
of student records. However, Doe's victory does stand for the proposition that plaintiffs might 
seek and be awarded more than de minimis damages under state law claims for invasion of privacy 
rather than the administrative slap on the hand threatened by FERP A. 
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ceive for creating local privacy policies_ usually derives from Guidances issued 
by the Department of Education that are, perforce, incomplete because they are 
. . 
only about federal laws, and not about state laws. Those Guidances can be mis-
leading because federal laws do not protect student privacy welL Thus, this 
Article is intended to serve notice that the Guidances do not, that numerous state 
law~ - constitutions: in particular- demand more privacy protection from school 
districts than federal laws demand. School districts must note that local distinc-
tion and prepare for protecting the greater privacy demanded by their respective 
state~ 
States may not legislate fewer rights than afforded by the United States 
Constitution, but they may and have legislated greater rights than afforded by 
the Constitution.15 In particular, states have created greater rights with resp·ect 
to privacy in contrast to federal law. The Supreme Court has not unequivocally 
determined that privacy exists or is protected under the Constitution .. Indeed, it 
is not even clear that the Supreme Court recognizes a right to informational pri-
vacy, a specific privacy right that would afford protection for student records.16 
Furthermore, federal legislation purporting to protect such student informational 
privacy has more holes than a sieve.17 As_ a consequence, state laws - constitu-
tions, statutes, regulations, common law - can be daubed in the holes to protect 
student privacy where. the Constitution and federal laws cannot or will not.18 
Part of the problem school districts face in this area is that state privacy 
laws have not always been given their due as most people have been enamored 
with the federal statutes, especially FERPA. However, school districts who put 
all their privacy eggs in the federal basket may still have problems with their 
local statutes and constitutions becaus_e of the absolute absence of any genuine 
15 States may provide greater rights than those afforded by the Constitution, especially liberty 
interests (ofwhich privacy is arguably one). See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982). 
16 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public 
~ector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV . . 553, 574-76 ( 1994-95). 
17 See, e.g., Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Education Informational Privacy for Public School-
children, 48 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Stuart, Lex-Praxis]. 
18 There seems to be no conflict in recognizing .greater privacy rights granted by state law than 
offered by federal law. The Supremacy Clause only requires preemption of state law by federal 
law when there exists an explicit indication of preemption by Congress, when it is a physical 
impossibility to comply with both state and federal law at the. same time, or when state law is an 
obstacle to the federal purpose. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., C.T.S. Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1987); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan .Ass"n v. de Ia Cuesta, 458 
U .. S. 141, 152-53 (1982). Little is suggested in any of the applicable federal privacy statutes that 
any such conflicts would arise in matters of states' granting privacy rights to its citizens, particu-
larly in expanding liberty interests (of which privacy is arguably one). See, e.g., Mills, 457 U.S. at 
300. The only exception appears to be that state privacy rights may have to give way to federal 
discovery requests. See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadut, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063 ... 
64 (7th Cir. 1981) (unauthorized disclosure provisions of state medical records statute preempted 
by discovery request in federal antitrust case); United States ex rei. Agency for lnt'l Dev. v. First 
Nat'l Bank of Md., 866 F._ Supp. 884, 886-87 (D. Md. 1994) (procedures in state confidential 
records act preempted by federal agency subpoena power). 
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privacy protections in federal statutes.•9 School districts may be forgiven this 
misunderstanding as the federal government, especially the Department of Edu-
cation, has insinuated itself more and more into the regulation of education, and 
school districts and school boards have forgotten what "local control'' really is. 
However, their constituents have not forgotten nor have their lawyers. 
Ill. STATE CONSTITUTIONS: PRIVACY AS FuNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
Unlike the United States Constitution, a handful of state constitutions 
specifically use the word "privacy" in their provisions. Others, like the C_onsti-
tution, have been interpreted to include privacy within their ''penumbras."20 
These provisions - whether express or implied - and the resulting interpretive 
case law have been characterized as a "laboratory" for the protection of privacy 
rights.21 Although some explicit provisions have been around since statehood, 
others have been added as the Supreme Court has grown more conservative and 
less inclined to recognize privacy rights.22 Thus, states have been amending 
their constitutions to create new privacy rights in recent decades.23 Similarly, 
other states have discovered penumbral privacy in more general provisions of 
their respective constitutions during the same time period.24 These provisions 
and judicial interpretations were originally designed to expand Fourth Amend-
ment and decisional-autonomy privacy rights. 25 These implicit provisions of 
privacy, along with the explicit provision, have become shelter for informational 
privacy and therefore are a potential source for protecting student records. 
A. Explicit Constitutional Privacy Rights 
Unlike the United States Constitution, ten states have constitutions pro-
viding explicit privacy rights that could afford protection to personal infonna-
tion. 26 Those states are Alaska, 27 Arizona, 28 California, 29 Florida, 30 Hawai' i, 31 
19 I posit in a separate article that there is an absolute privacy protection under the Constitu-
tion. Susan P. Stuart, Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on Education Privacy as 
Constitutional Liberty, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 563 (2004) [hereinafter Stuart, Primer]~ 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
See generally Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3. 
/d. at 1428-31. 
/d. at 1423-25. 
/d. 
See infra text accompanying notes 92-129. 
25 Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3 at 1425. 
26 Id. at 1423-24; Gormley & Hartman, supra note 4, at 1282-83. This list does not include 
those- states whose constitutions provide a specific right to privacy to crime victims: IDAHO 
CONST. art.l, § 22; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; N.M. CONST. art. II,§ 24; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m. 
27 
''The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed .... " ALASKA 
CON ST. art. l, § 22 (emphasis added). 
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lllinois,32 Louisiana,33 Montana,34 South Carolina,J5 and Washington.36 Al-
though the language in some of these provisions clearly reflects Fourth 
Amendment-type protections from warrantless searches and seizures, nearly all 
of them expressly or impliedly cover more than that. For example, the South 
Carolina Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
and unreasonable invasions of privacy 't ••• " 37 More broadly, the majority of 
these explicit provisions protect an unadulterated, more overarching right to 
privacy: "[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be in-
fringed''38 or "[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a 
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state 
interest.,"39 Florida's Constitution has one of the most expansive privacy provi-
sions: ~'Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from govern-
mental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided 
28 
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority 
of law.'' ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8 (emphasis added). 
29 
''All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these 
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added). 
30 
"Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into 
the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed 
to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law~" FLA. 
CoNST. art. 1, § 23 (emphasis added). 
31 
"The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the 
showing of a compelling state interest ..•. " HAw. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis added). 
32 
"The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses~ papers and other pos-
sessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of commu-
nications by eavesdropping devices or other means .... " ILL. CaNST. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis 
added). 
33 
"Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. ~ .. " LA. CaNST. art. 1, § 
5 (emphasis added). 
34 
"The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not 
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." MoNT. CoN ST. art. 2, § 10 (em-
phasis added). 
35 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated ... 
. " S.C. CaNST. art. I~ § 10 (emphasis added). 
36 
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority 
of law.'' WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (emphasis added). 
37 S.C. CONST. an. I, § 10; see also ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5. A shorter 
variation exists in Arizona's and Washington's Constitutions: "No person shall be disturbed in his 
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; WASH. 
CoNST. art l, § 7. 
38 
39 
ALASKA CONST~ art. 1, § 22; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6. 
MONT. CoNS1. art. 2, § 10. 
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herein. ,,4o This greater coverage is significant because, unlike the Constitution, 
these state constitutions either do or can unequivocally protect information pri-
vacy~ 
Even more significant is the emphasis the state courts put on these ex-
plicit constitutional provisions when they interpret privacy as a state-endowed 
fundamental right.41 One state constitution itself even ascribes inalienability to 
this privacy right.42 At the state level, this particular explicit right shares the 
protections inuring to the rights and freedoms of speech, religion, and associa-
tion. Consequently, this right of privacy does not suffer the incertitude assigned 
to a federal, constitutional right of privacy,. Instead, what is also fairly universal 
in most of these jurisdictions is the certitude that state constitutional privacy 
rights are greater than federal constitutional privacy rights.43 
For instance, Alaska's constitutional privac.y protects marijuana posses-
sion in one's own home.44 Similarly, Arizona's constitutional provision protects 
the right to refuse medical treatment, and hence protects the right to die.45 C,ali-
fomia has even extended protection over its citizens' privacy by interpreting its 
constitution to apply to private intrusions, not just to governmental intrusions.46 
Because of this explicit language and expansive interpretation, these 
courts have expanded these state constitutional privacy provisions to protect the 
right to autonomy and the right to be left alone and, thus, to protect infortna-
tional privacy,47 decision-making privacy,48 and Fourth Amendment physical 
privacy.49 Thus, some state courts have afforded expansive privacy rights un-
der these explicit provisions that are difficult to attain in federal constitutional 
decisions. One court used such a provision to stake out a broad area of coverage 
40 FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23. 
41 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. D~B., 784 So. 2d 585, 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 200'1); 
State, Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. McCorkle, 694 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Armstrong v. 
State, 989 P.2d 364, 373-74 (Mont. 1999). See generally Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 
P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997). 
42 CAL. CONST. art. 1 , § 1. 
43 See, e.g., Lungren, 940 P.2d at 808; Commitment of Smith v. State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1030 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Bd. of County Comm'rs, 784 So~- 2d at 588; State v. K~ 748 P.2d 
372, 377 (Haw. 1988); A.G. Edwards, Inc~ v. Sec'y of State, 772 N.E.2d 362, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002); People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 298 (Ill. 2004); State v. Vikesdal, 688 So. 2d 685, 
691 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Armstrong v. State, 989 P~2d at 373-74; State v., McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 
49 (Wash. 2002). 
44 State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 94 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the provision "pro-
tects an adult's right to possess a limited amount of marijuana in their [sic] home for personal use" 
(citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975)). 
45 Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987). 
46 Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994); Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
47 
48 
49 
See, e.g., State v ~ Lester, 649 P .2d 346, 353 (Haw. 1982). 
See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren; 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997). 
See, e.g., Hill, 865 P.2d 633. 
• 
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that protects "[a] private affairs interest[,] an object or a matter personal to an 
individual such that any intrusion on it would offend a reasonable person.''50 
Similarly, another court prefers to keep its constitutional definition of "privacy" 
flexible and relevant to the circumstances of each case,51 while a sister court 
asserts that its state's constitutional provision establishes a zone of privacy 
~'broadly and without restrictions."52 One court extended privacy so far as to 
embrace common law concepts, that the right to privacy in the constitution is 
the equivalent of the right to be let alone. The court stated that the constitu..., 
tional provision means to be free of public scrutiny, to be free from unreason-
able intrusions into one's private affairs, and to be free from intrusion upon se-
clusion. 53 
Under any interpretation of these state constitutional privacies, the 
courts usually employ a test that is similar to the one derived from Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence: Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy?54 Sev-
eral states use such a reasonable expectation starting point - Alaska, 55 Califor-
nia,56 Aorida,57 Illinois,58 and Louisiana.59 The state courts' threshold test will 
protect a subjective expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize 
as reasonable."60 As a result, some courts have adopted a two-step examination 
for testing privacy interests. First,_ the court will examine the individual's sub-
jective expectation of privacy; second, it will examine whether or not society is 
50 
51 
52 
State v. Repton, 54 P.3d 233, 238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
Hill, 865 P.2d at 651. 
People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 298 (Ill. 2004); A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, 
772 N.E.2d 362, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
53 Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562,- 566 (La. 
1997). These three_ privacies are all protected under tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 652(A) (1977). 
54 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27t 33 (2001); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U~S. 347, 359 (1967). 
55 Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738 (Alaska 1990) . 
56 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren; 940 P.2d 797, 811 (Cal. 1997); Bearman v. Superior 
Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 2.004), review denied (June 30, 2004). 
57 Commitment of Smith v. State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1030 (Fla. CLApp. 2002). 
58 People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 300 (Ill. 2004); A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, 
772 N.E.2d 362, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
59 Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562, 566 (La. 
1997); E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen; 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004), writ denied 897 So. 2d 608 (La. 2005). 
60 Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738 (internal quotation omitted); see also Capital City Press v. E. 
Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562, 566 (La. 1997); State v. Hepton, 54 P.3d 
233, 238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) ("A private affairs interest is an object or a matter personal to an 
individual such that any intrusion on it would offend a reasonable person."). 
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willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.61 That examination ne.ces-
sarily has some limits .. 
To be sure, these state constitutional rights are not necessarily absolute 
rights,62 particularly as suggested by the limitations set by the reasonableness of 
one's expectation of privacy. State constitutional privacy rights may be broader 
than federal rights, but they might still have to give way to other interests. They 
may have to give way to the public interest- on a case-by-case basis63 - or give 
way to the rights of others.64 But nearly uniformly, government intrusions on 
these constitutional provisions trigger strict scrutiny because of the provisions' 
status as fundamental rights.65 Therefore, such intrusion passes constitutional 
muster only if there is a compelling state interest66 and the intrusion is effected 
by the least restrictive means.67 Consequently, these explicit state constitutional 
provisions grant broader protections to their citizens than does the Constitution 
61 G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); E. Bank Consol. Special 
Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct. App. 2004 ), writ denied 897 So. 2d 
608 (La. 2005); Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ-., 675 P.2d 962, 967 (Mont. 1984); 
State v. McKinney; 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002). 
62 See; e.g., Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738; Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 298; Capital City Press, 696 
So. 2d at 566. 
63 See, e.g., Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); E. 
Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct. App. 2004), 
writ denied, 897 So. 2d 608 (La. 2005). One of those important public interests is government 
transparency under state open records laws. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 
585; 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). However, the variations of disclosure under and in compli-
ance with open records acts is beyond the scope of this Article. In any case, that raises the ques-
tion of whether or not school records are public records under state law and, therefore, even come 
under the jurisdiction of the open records acts. There is an argument that some student records are, 
in reality, private records for which schools are only the bailee. See Stuart, Primer, supra note 19, 
at 637-39. 
64 State, Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. McCorkle, 694 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
65 G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1062; McCorkle, 694 So. 2d at 1081; Annstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 
374 (Mont. 1999). 
66 See, e.g., Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 811 
(Cal. 1997) ("compelling interest" test applies in autonomy privacy); Commitment of Smith v. 
State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1031 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002); Bd. of County Comm'rs, 784 So. 2d at 588; 
State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 378 (Haw. 1988); Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374. 
67 See, e.g., Jennings; 788 P.2d at 738 (''least intrusive"); Commitment of Smith, 827 So. 2d at 
1031; McCorkle, 694 So. 2d at 1081 ("narrowly defined"); Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374 (Mont. 
1999) ("narrowly tailored"); see also Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 298 (constitutional provision pro-
. . 
tects from uunreasonable" invasions of privacy). To be sure, there is an occasional variation to this 
commonly recognized constitutional scrutiny: in Hill v. NCAA, 865 P!'2d 633 (Cat 1994), the 
California Supreme Court - in a student-athlete drug-testing case- used a "balancing test'; that 
weighed the particular privacy interest against a legitimate governmental (or, here, private) inter-
est. Id. at 655. Another California case only required "good causeH to support a subpoena for 
medical records. Bearman v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 647-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), 
review denied, (June 30, 2004). However, the more consistent test used by the state courts in 
testing their constitutional privacy rights is strict scrutiny. 
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by according citizens a fundamental right to privacy, even to minors.68 The 
question remains about their coverage over minors' student records. 
Regardless of the language, the majority of this type of state constitu-
tional provisions protects infortnational privacy in general and, therefore, likely 
protects student records in particular.69 Protections in at least three states recog-
nize informational privacy as an overarching, general concept derived from the 
constitutional provision. In California, inforttlational privacy is protected as the 
interest "in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential 
information."70 And "[a] particular class of infortnation is private when well-
established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over 
its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity."71 
Likewise, Montana72 and Hawai'i73 broadly recognize infortnational privacy as 
within the particular ambit of their constitutions. 
The remaining states also seem to provide coverage for infortnational 
privacy, but the analysis is derived in response to particular problems; they have 
not yet thrown a protective blanket over information per se. Because the qurere 
before these courts did not strike so generally, representative cases address on a 
piecemeal basis the protection of specific types of information. Particularly 
protected in these cases are health care information,74 evaluation procedures and 
personnel matters concerning public employees,75 taped conversations,76 phone 
68 E.g., B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1995); S.C. v. Guardian ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 
953, 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Lungren, 940 P.2d at 814; In re T.A.J., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 
334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
69 To date, only South Carolina and Arizona seem not to have addressed informational privacy 
cases under their respective constitutions. South Carolina's situation might be best attributable to 
the fact that it is more akin to the Fourth Amendment search and seizure privacy issues than pri-
vacy in general. That is not to say that information privacy would not be protected by these two 
states' provisions. Such apparently limiting language has not stopped other states from interpret-
ing their own provisions to provide broader than expected information protection. See, e.g., ILL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5. 
70 
71 
72 
Lungren, 940 P.2d at 812; Hill, 865 P.2d at 654. 
Hill, 865 P.2d at 654. 
State v. Bilant, 36 P.3d 883, 887 (Mont. 2001). 
73 State v. Lester, 649 P.2d 346, 353 (Haw. 1982). Hawaii's constitutional provision also 
protects the interests formulated in the common law invasion of privacy tort, such as the unauthor-
ized disclosure of personal or embarrassing facts. /d. 
74 Bilant, 36 P.3d at 887. 
75 Teamsters Local 856 v. Priceless, L.L.C., 5 Cal. Rptr 3d 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), review 
denied (Jan. 22, 2004) (detailed salary infonnation); E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. 
v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 670 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (discovery request for assistant fire chiefs 
complete personnel file denied because such files come within the employee's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy); Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294, 300 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (constitution prohib-
its public access to evaluation reports of city's department directors because they are confidential, 
disclosure may inhibit candid and objective evaluations, and disclosure may embarrass or humili-
ate the employee); Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 973 (Mont. 1984) 
(constitution protects job performance evaluations of state university presidents for which inter-
viewee had been promised anonymity and confidentiality). 
2005] A LOCAL DISTINCTION 371 
records,77 private records,78 personal banking records,79 confidential therapy 
records,80 disclosure of sexual activity on adoption petitions,81 and medical re-
cords.82 Other protections include limits on the disclosure of public employee 
records during discovery, such as financial infortnation and family names and 
addresses. 83 In California, in protecting the identities of an attorney's clients, 
the court of appeals protected infortnation, such as financial affairs, political 
affiliates, medical history, and sexual relationships.84 Another California deci-
sion protected juvenile court reports on suspected sexual abuse of minors, in-
cluding psychological examinations, social services reports, and hospital re-
ports.85 Not all infortnation is afforded such privacy protection,86 but the trend 
among the states favors doing so. Given this overarching protection for a wide 
range of information, the imagination is little stretched to include student re-
cords within the analogous coverage of these decisions. 
Presently, there seems to be only one published case that deals with the 
constitutional protection of student records. In Porten v. University of San 
Francisco, a college student sued the University of San Francisco ("USF') for 
disclosing grades he earned at Columbia University to the State Scholarship and 
Loan Commission.87 Upon his transfer to USF, he had been assured that his 
grades from Columbia would be kept confidential and not disclosed to third 
parties without his consent. Instead, the USF sent his Columbia transcript to the 
76 Lester, 649 P.2d at 353. 
77 State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002); but see People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 
1277, 1282-83 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (telephone records are private but are accessible by grand jury 
subpoena). 
78 People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 300 (Ill. 2004). 
79 
80 
A. G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, 772 N.E.2d 362, 369, 371 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
S.C. v. Guardian ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953, 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
81 G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061, I 063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); but see Borges v. City 
of W. Palm Beach, 858 F.Supp. 174 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (constitution did not protect arrest record for 
solicitation of prostitution even though found not guilty because it was a public record). 
82 Bearman v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
83 
84 
85 
Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 739 (Alaska 1990). 
Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 347-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
In re Tiffany G., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 9-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994 ). 
86 Public employee drug-testing may not be protected information under state constitutional 
privacy. McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dept., 799 P.2d 953, 956-57 (Haw. 1990); see also Hill v. 
NCAA, 865 P .2d 633, 635 (Cal. 1994 ). In Louisiana, applications for public employment are 
accessible to the press. Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 
562, 566-67 (La. 1997) (job applications and resumes for position at metropolitan airport authority 
are not confidential once they have been submitted). Driver's license records are not historically 
protected in Washington. State v. MciGnney, 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002). And there is no pri-
vacy right in a notice provided to school by a minor under the tort claims act. Poway Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Super. Ct., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
87 Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
• 
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Commission, even though it was neither needed nor requested. 88 As this was 
one of the earliest cases testing the limits of the newly ratified California consti-
tutional privacy provision, the court of appeals enumerated the four primary 
"mischiefs" the new provision prohibited: 1) government snooping and gather-
ing personal inforntation in secret; 2) overbroad business and governmental 
collection and retention of unnecessary personal information; 3) improper use of 
personal infonnation collected for another specific purpose, including imRroper 
disclosure to third parties; and 4) unchecked inaccuracies of information. 9 The 
court then determined that Parten's complaint focused on the third mischief, 
"improper use of infonnation properly obtained for a specific purpose."90 The 
. court ruled Parten had stated a prima facie violation of California's constitu-
tional provision.91 
Therefore, explicit state constitutional privacy provisions likely protect 
student records from disclosure to a greater extent than federal law. 
B. Implicit Constitutional Privacy Rights 
Reaching similar results are those state courts that have divined implicit 
privacy rights in their constitutions. The rise of these newly discovered privacy 
rights is in no small measure due to hot-button issues in federal litigation, such 
as abortion-regulation statutes, restrictions on medical decision-making, and 
criminalization of homosexual conduct. Plaintiffs are taking advantage of state 
constitutional litigation in these areas because they are more likely to success-
fully protect their autonomy privacy that federal courts are becoming increas-
ingly reluctant to grant under the Constitution.92 States with such implicit pri-
vacy rights currently93 include Kentucky,94 Minnesota,95 New Hampshire,96 New 
Jersey,97 Pennsylvania,98 Tennessee,99 and Texas.100 
88 
89 
90 
• 
• 
/d. 
Id. at 842 (citing White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975)). 
/d. 
91 Id. at 843-44. The court narrowed its analysis to reach this result after consulting additional 
statutory authority in the California Education Code and the newly enacted FERP A. The Porten 
court then suggested that the University would have to provide a compelling public interest for the 
unauthorized transmission of the Columbia transcript in order to overcome the plaintiffs prima 
facie case. /d. Note that later California cases have elided by this strict scrutiny standard. See 
supra note 62. 
92 See generally Gormley & Hartman, supra note 4, at 1287-89. The Gonnley & Hartman 
article is a nice compendium of state constitutional privacy cases through 1992. 
93 Indiana recently flirted with the notion that it protects a fundamental right of privacy in 
Indiana Constitution art. I, § l. Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 814 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004), vacated 837 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. 2005). The Indiana Supreme Court determined that, 
even if Indiana's constitution protects a woman's fundamental right to tenninate her pregnancy, 
the challenged uwaiting-period" statute was not a "material burden" on that right. ld. at 988. 
94 KY. CONST. §§ 1, 2: 
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§ 1: All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and in-
alienable rights, among which may be reckoned: 
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . 
• 
**** 
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness. 
**** 
§ 2: Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of 
freemen exists nowhere-in a republic, not even in the largest majority. 
See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,492-95 (Ky. 1992). 
95 MINN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 2, 10: 
§ 1: Government is instituted for the security, benefit and protection of the 
people, in whom all political power is inherent, together with the right to alter, 
modify or refonn government whenever required by the public good. 
§ 2: No member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of 
the rights or privileges -secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the 
land or the judgment of his peers. . . . 
**** 
§ 10: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant -shall issue but upon probable cause .... 
See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N. W .2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988). 
96 N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 2 & 3: 
Art. 2: All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights - among 
which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness. -· 
•• 
Art. 3: When men enter into a state of society, they surrender up some of their 
natural rights to that society, in order to ensure the protection ofothers; and, 
without such an equivalent, the surrender is void. 
See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984 ). 
373 
97 N.J .. CaNST. art. 1, CJ[ 1: "AU persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain 
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, 
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting_ property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happi-
ness." 
See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 
1976). 
98 PA. CaNST. art. 1, § 1: "All men are born equally fre.e and independent, and have certain 
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, 
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happi-
ness." 
See In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa~ 1980). 
99 TENN. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 7, 8, 19, 27 (Declaration of Rights). Tennessee's broad sanction 
of privacy seems to arise from the penumbras of its bill of rights, most particularly (but not exclu-
sively) shaped by Tennessee Constitution art. I, § 8; "[N]o man shall be taken or imprisoned, or 
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed 
or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his--peers or the law of the land:" 
See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). 
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The source of most of these implicit privacy rig_hts is primarily the re-
spective state's bill of rights. More specifically, the source of constitutional 
. . 
privacy is inherent in the inalienable rights of t~e state citizens in Kentucky, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey; and Pennsylvania. For example, New Jersey's 
Constitution provides: ''All persons are by nature free and independent, and 
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying 
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, 
and of purs:uing and obtaining safety and happiness_." 101 Similarly worded is 
New Hampshire's constitutional provision that protects privacy: ~'All men have 
. 
certain natural, essential, and inherent rights - among which are, the enjoying 
and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; 
and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.''102 · · 
The right to privacy is ,also found in state constitutional due process 
provisions, such as in the Minnesota and. Tennessee Constitutions: "No member 
of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privi-
leges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judg.-
ment of his peers .... " 103 Or "no-man shall be ... deprived of his life, liberty 
or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.'' 104 Texas's 
constitutional right to privacy is even more ephemeral, apparently emanating 
from the penumbras of the document itself, the penumbras of being Texan. 105 
Regardless of the sources, these constitutional provisions protect a pri-
vacy of similar dimensions and with similar scrutiny as their sister jurisdictions 
with explicit privacy provisions. However, with the inherent vagueness of any 
implication, the state court decisions in these jurisdictions- tend to be a little 
vaguer in their recognition of a state constitutional right to privacy, in contrast 
to the explicit privacy rights. For instance, Texas recognizes zones of privacy1-06 
while Pennsylvania has a broad privacy right that includes the right to be let 
alone107 and the right to prevent disclosure of personal matters. 108 Tennessee's 
100 The cases dealing with Texas's right of privacy never specify a particular provision in the 
state constitution from which the right arises. Presumably, it is a "penumbral" right, arising from 
the nature of the document itself~ See, e.g., Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental 
Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987); see also TEx. CONST~ art. 1, § 9. 
101 N.J. CONST. art. 1 , <JI l. 
102 
103 
IU4 
105 
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2. 
MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 
TENN. CON ST. art. I, § 8. 
"'We do not doubt ... that a right of individual privacy is implicit among those 'general, 
great, and essential principles of liberty and free government' established by the Texas Bill of 
Rights.n Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 
S.W.2d 203,205 (Tex. 1987); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276,285 (Tex. App. 1995). 
106 Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App. 1995) (citing Tex. State Employees 
Union, 746 S.W.2d at 203). 
101 Commonwealth v. Nixon~ 761 A.2d 1151, 1156 (Pa. 2000) (citing Stenger v. Lehigh Valley 
Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992)). 
108 In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980). 
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constitutional right to privacy is interpreted as "the right to be let alone."109 
These categories are somewhat fuzzier than those elucidated when the privacy 
right is explicit. 
In any event, these decisions too assert that these state constitutional 
provisions recognize broader privacy interests than the United State Constitu-
tion. 110 Although they acknowledge this constitutional right to privacy is not 
absolute, 111 they agree it is fundamental. 112 Just as with explicit constitutional 
provisions, the implicit provision of privacy must be protected from unreason-
able intrusion, and any such intrusion is subject to strict scrutiny and a compel-
ling state interest113 or, at the very least, a countervailing public interest. 114 
These implicit constitutional provisions also recognize and usually pro-
t~ct infor?Iational privacy w~en s~ch privacy is at issue. Thel protect info~­
tional pnvacy, generally, tn Mtnnesota,l 15 New Jersey, 11 Pennsylvania, 117 
Texas118 and perhaps Tennessee;. 119 One court has designated the right as such 
. . 
''freedom from disclos.ure of certain matters which an individual deems so per-
sonal that publication adversely affects one's right to the pursuit of life, liberty, 
and happiness."120 State courts have variously afforded this protection to medi-
109 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 
250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). 
11° Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 491, 497 (Ky. 1992); State v. Davidson, 481 
. . 
N.W.2d 51,58 (Minn. 1992); Campbell, 926- S.W.2d at 261. 
111 Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), affd, 383 A.2d 428 
(N.J. 1978); Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1156; Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 543 
A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). 
112 See, e.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, Ill (Minn. 1987). 
113 See, e.g., State v. Mellett, 642 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); In re Caulk, 480 
A.2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984); Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1156; Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 262; Tex. State 
Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 
(Tex. 1987); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App. 1995). 
114 Lehrhaupt; 356 A.2d at 41; Fischer, 543 A.2d at 179. 
115 Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., Special Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 512 N.W.2d 107, Ill (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
116 
117 
118 
119 
Lehrhaupt, 383 A.2d at 428. 
In re June. 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980). 
Fox v~ Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. App. 1993). 
Both federal and state courts have determined that the Tennessee Constitution does not 
protect the privacy of information. Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480-82 (6th Cir. 1999); 
Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999). The reasoning of the former is barely sup~ 
ported by law and is not binding on a state. court while the reasoning of the latter is somewhat 
suspect because its underlying and confusing rationale is based on precedent that has nothing to 
do with Tennessee's constitutional right to privacy. 
12° Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 543 A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1988) (citing In re June 1979,415 A.2d 73). 
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cal reports, 121 financial records, 122 employment . records, 123 lists of group mem-
bers, 124 identities of victims of sexual assault, 125 polygraph testing by a state 
agency, 126 and court records that would reveal a minor's identity and settlement 
of his tort claim from a sexual assault by an AIDs-infected counselor. 127 
However, the basis for the authority to use implicit constitutional pri-
vacy provisions to protect informational privacy is not nearly as overwhelming 
as authority under explicit privacy provisions. Based on the extant published 
cases, fewer litigants have used implicit constitutional protections to challenge 
government intrusions into citizens' privacy. That is not to say that other juris-
dictions w~ll not recognize informational privacy when the issue aris.es. If one 
examines the vintage of these cases, one notes that they are only ten to fifteen 
years old. Fewer implicit privacy provisions have been recognized because, 
apparently, fewer implicit privacy provisions have been tested in court But 
with the increased interest in plaintiffs' resorting to state constitutional protec-
tions,-the trend to imply privacy rights in th-ose constitutions cannot be. ignored 
by school districts. 
Both explicit and implicit privacy provisions in state constitutions offer 
a safe haven to student records that might not be present in the United States 
Constitution. Indeed, student records are those documents in which citizens 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. As a fundamental right, these state 
constitutional privacy rights would take preceden.ce over any conflicting federal 
or state statutes that purport to allow disclosure without a compelling state inter-
est. A compelling state interest would obviously embrace legitimate educational 
interests in the records, 128 but other non-educational interests should have an 
uphill battle arguing for disclosure of this infom1ation in these states. Although 
not necessarily an exemplar of student records privacy, Porten comes closest to 
nailing the real privacy issue~ H schools collect personal information from 
schoolchildren for a legitimate educational purpose, then by what right may 
121 . In re June 1979, 415 A.2d at 75..;78 (court authorized limited disclosure of medical reports 
on tissue specimens pursuant to subpoena only because of grand jury secrecy rules but promised 
confidentiality for purposes of further litigation); Fox, 869 S.W.2d at 504. 
122 Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 41-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div~ 1976) aff'd, 383 A.2d 
428 (N.J. 1978) (holding that financial infonnation is protected by constitution but government 
transparency requires municipal officials to file annual reports of assets and liabilities); Fox, 869 
S.W.2d at 507; see also Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (teacher disciplinary 
records ate not protected from government transparency). 
123 Fox, 869 S. W.2d at 504. 
124 /d. 
125 /d. 
126 Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation., 746 
S.W.2d 203, 205-06 (Tex. 1987). 
127 Fox, 869 S.W.2d at 507. 
128 E.g., 20 U.S.C. § l232g(b)(I) (2000). 
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schools disclose that infom1ation in the absence of a parallel legitimate educa-
tional purpose?129 
School administrators in the affected states must be aware of the growth 
in state constitutional litigation and give due consideration to whether compli-
ance with disclosure requests - even under FERP A or state open records acts -
is a wise idea in light of the fundamental protections offered to infortnational 
privacy under their state constitutions. htdeed, school districts in all other states 
must be aware of the movement to rely on state constitutions as the source of 
privacy rights and be prepared to defend privacy policies that do not stand up to 
the strict scrutiny of "need to know." 
IV. PRIVACY STATUTES & REGULATIONS PROTECTING STUDENT RECORDS 
A more prevalent type of privacy protection afforded by states is 
through legislation; many state statutes provide privacy to student records. 
Some state statutes make student records private information as a matter of law. 
Such statutes include those that are derived from FERP A and those that simply 
afford specific privacy protection to these student records. ·Similarly, state edu-
cation departments have promulgated regulations that offer privacy protections, 
especially for special education records.130 The "advantage" of these statutes 
over federal statutes is that private enforcement is likely available, in contrast to 
the limitations placed on FERPA by Gonzaga University v. Doe. 
A. Mini-FERPAs~· Statutes&. Regulations 
The majority of states that have developed student record privacy re-
gimes have done so by en grafting the principles of FERP A into their own local 
statutes. FERPA is the federal statute that hinges federal funding upon compli-
ance with a statutory framework that denotes what student records may be dis-
closed and to whom.131 Its coverage is comprehensive and detailed in establish-
ing what is an education record subject to protection and what is not, how edu-
cation records can be disclosed and to whom. 132 Although FERP A does not 
129 Such limitation on disclosures may even significantly limit the reach non-educational dis-
closures currently allowed under FERPA. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l}(D) (student aid); 20 
. . 
U.S.C. § 1232g (b)(l)(E) (juvenile justice authorities); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (b)(l)(J) (grand jury 
subpoenas). See generally, Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17. 
130 It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the specific protections for all student 
information, such as screening tests, individual surveys, etc. The focus here is on privacy protec-
tions that cast their net broadly over student information in education records. 
131 20U.S.C. § 1232g. 
132 /d.; see generally Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17; Lynn M. Daggett & Dixie Snow 
Huefner, Recognizing Schools' Legitimate Educational Interests: Rethinking FERPA's Approach 
to the Confidentiality of Student Discipline and Classroom Records, 51 AM. U .. L. REv. 1 (2001); 
Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley 1: Making the Federal Student Records Statute Work, 46 
CATH. U. L. REv. 617 (1996-97). 
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protect students' "directory information" -- name, home address, telephone 
number, age, and the like133 -- it does protect ''e,ducation re,cords," which are 
"records, files, documents, and other materials which . . . contain information 
directly related to a student; and ... are maintained by an educational agency or 
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution."134 FERPA then 
prescribes four primary areas of responsibilities for school districts vis a vis 
those records~ 135 Those basic areas are providing parental access to student edu-
cation records; supplying notice of that access to parents; regulating the disclo-
sure of education records, particularly nonconsensual disclosure; and regulating 
the collection of information in student records. 136 Education records may be 
disclosed and/or accessed by certain third parties, but for the most part, those 
disclosure and access provisions are rather narrow. 137 Perhaps becaus_e of 
FERPA's familiarity, a large number of state legislatures have adapted its prin-
ciples, in some shape or form, to govern privacy in their respective states' public 
schools. 138 
One method of incorporating FERP A into a state privacy regime is to 
simply incorporate it by reference to its name and citation.139 For instance, 
Utah's relevant statute states: 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
l38 
Employe.es and agents of the state's public education system 
shall protect the privacy of students, their parents, and their 
families . . . through compliance with the protections provided 
for family and student privacy under . . . the Federal Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act and related provisions un-
der 20 U.S.C,. 1232(g) and (h) in the administration and opera-
tion of all public school programs, regardless of the source of 
funding. 140 
20 U~S.C~ § 1232g(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (2005). 
20 UwS.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A). 
ld. § 1232g. 
/d.; see also- Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17. 
20 u.s.c. § 1232g. 
See generally Richard A. Leiter, ed., NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 269-74 (5th ed. 
2005). 
139 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-141 & 15-1043 (2002); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 20-A § 5001-A 
(West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 15.243(2) (2001 & Supp. 2005) (incorporated in open records 
act as exemption); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-15-3 (2001); MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 20-1-213(1) (2003); 
NEV. REV. ST~ §§ 3.86.650 & 386.655 (2003); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN., § 189:1-e (1999); UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 53A-13-301(1) (2000); WASH. REv. CODE§ 28A.605.030 (Supp. 2005). Colorado, 
curiously enough, has incorporated FERP A into its open records act, thereby regulating disclo-
sure~ not privacy. Cow. REv. STAT.§ 24-72-204(3) (2004). 
140 UTAHCODEANN. § 53A-l3-301 (2000). 
• 
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Nevada's statute simply provides that "the public schools ... shall comply with 
the provisions of ... the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto ; .. ~"141 Similarly pro-
saic are Arizona's142 and Maine's143 wholesale incorporation of FERPA into 
their statutory scheme. · 
That is not to say that state statutes have incorporated FERP A carte 
blanche without some adaptation. Some legislatures have incorporated it for 
reference only and have still created th-eir own disclosure and access regimes. 
For example, Michigan has incorporated FERPA's disclosure exemptions gen-
erally then further exempted (at the discretion of the school district) even direc-
tory information from disclosure for purposes of marketing, surveys and solici-
tation. 144 Mississippi has only incorporated FERP A's parental access pro vi-
sion145 whereas Washington has adopted only FERPA's nonconsensual disclo-
sure provisions.146 New Hampshire only incorporates FERPA's directory in-
fonnation provision: "A local education ,agency which maintains education 
records may provide information designated as directory infortnation consistent 
with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)."147 Montana 
limits FERPA's provisions only to matters of disclosure to the juvenile justice 
system 148 while Oregon includes that and the provisions for disclosure to law 
• 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
NEV. REv. ST. § 386.655( 1 )(a). 
ARIZ~ REv. STAT.§§ 15-141A & 15-1043 (2002 & Supp. 2005). 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 5001-A. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.243(2). 
MISS. CODE ANN.§ 37-15-3 (2001). 
WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.605.030 (Supp. 2005). The Washington statute is rather hard to 
follow insofar as it suggests that student records may be disclosed without consent in accordance 
with FERP A. However, local school districts are instructed to establish procedures prohibiting 
the release of student records without parental consent. 
147 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 189:1-e (1999). 
148 MONT. CODE ANN.§ 20-1-213(5) (2003); see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 6001(3) 
(Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 180.1135(5) (2001) (FERPA. limits disclosure to law en-
forcement agencies). Washington incorporates FERPA in only a couple of instances, one of 
which is cooperation with the juvenile justice system. WASH. REv~ CODE § 11.40.480 (2004 ). As 
a point of reference, FERP A has carved out a specific, limited exception concerning the disclosure 
of student records when disclosed to juvenile justice authorities; disclosure is appropriate pursuant 
to specific state statutes governing the same. 20 U .S.C. § 1232(b)( 1 )(E) (2000). These statutes 
are also supposed to assure these records will not be further disclosed without written consent of 
the parent(s). See generally Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17. Hence, states are likely to empha-
size special disclosure rules for the juvenile justice system, as in Arizona, ARIZ. REv~ STAT. § 15-
1410 (2002 & Supp. 2005); Florida, FLA. STAT. § l002.22(3)(d)(l3) (2004 & Supp. 2005); Illi-
nois, 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/6(a)(6.5) (1998 & Supp. 2005); Indiana, IND. CODE§§ 20-33-7-1 to 
-3 (2004); Iowa, IOWA CODE ·§ 280.25 {Supp. 2005); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 6001 
(Supp. 2004); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT.§ 336.187(l)(b) (2003); and WASH. REV. CODE§ 13.40.480 
(2004). A state that does not have such special provisions violates FERP A when its local school 
districts hand over student records to the juvenile justice system. 
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enforcement agencies when necessary for the health and safety of the student 
and others. 149 . 
On the other hand, some states have actually mimicked FERP A by 
drafting their own mini-FERPAs that govern access to and disclosure of student 
records. 150 Some of these state "mini-FERP As'' are complex and intricate, such 
.as California's, which is more comprehensive than FERPA itself. California's 
pupil records protection includes specific statutory pro.visions for parental notice 
of access to student records, 151 maintenance of logs noting persons requesting 
and receiving access to student records, 152 release of directory information! 53 
and regulation of access to and disclosure of records to third parties.154 Equally 
inclusive is Florida's mini-FERPA, the purpose of which is to 
protect the rights of students and their parents with respect to 
student records and reports as created, maintained, and used by 
public educational institutions of the state. The intent of the 
Legislature is that students and their parents shall have rights of 
access, rights of challenge, and rights of privacy with respect to 
such records and reports, and that rules shall be available for the 
exercise of these rights. 155 
Similarly comprehensive are the lllinois School Student Records Act, 156 the 
Kentucky Family Education Rights and Privacy Act,157 the Colorado statute for 
the protection of student data, 158 and the Wisconsin pupil records act, 159 all of 
which provide for parental notice and access and limited disclosure to certain 
third parties. 
149 OR. REv. STAT.§ 336.187(1)(a). 
15° CAL. Eouc. CODE§§ 49060-49079 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4111 (1999 & 
Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. § 1002.22 (2004 & Supp. 2005); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 to 10/10. 
(1998 & Supp. 2005); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 160.710 (West 1999); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 
3319.321 (LexisNexis 2004); VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-287 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. 
§ 118.125 (2004). 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
CAL .. Eouc. CODE § 49063. 
ld. § 49064. 
Id. § 49073. 
ld. §§ 49075-77. 
FLA. STAT.§ 1002.22(1). 
156 1051LL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 to 10/10 (1998 & Supp. 2005). 
157 KY:REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 160.700-.730 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). Kentucky presumes 
student records are confidential. /d. § 160. 705( 1 ). 
158 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-123 (2004). Colorado's statute is a blend of its own FERPA-Iike 
organization while periodically incorporating federal ~tatutory citations, such as FERPA's. 
159 WIS. STAT.§ 118.125 (2004). Wisconsin's statute, like Kentucky's, starts with the premise 
that pupil records are confidential then lists numerous exceptions to that confidentiality. WIS. 
STAT. § 118.125(2). 
• 
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Some state statutes pattern themselves after FERPA but provide more 
presumptive privacy rights. For example, the Florida student privacy statute is 
the most rigorous in the country although it is similar to FERPA in many re-
spects in its regulation of parental access, parental notice, and nonconsensual 
disclosures. Florida's legislative purpose is that 
. . [e]very student has a right of privacy with respect to the educa-
tional records kept on him or her.. Personally identifiable re-
cords or reports of a student, and any personal information con-
tained therein, are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) 
[open records act]. A state .or local educational agency, board, 
public school, career center, or public postsecondary educa-
tional institution may not permit the release of such records, re-
ports, or information without the written consent of the student's 
parent, or of the student himself or herself if he or she is quali-
fied as provided in this subsection, to any individual, agency, or 
organization. 160 
Similarly, Delaware's mini-FERPA denotes all student "personal" records as 
confidential and, unlike FERP A, restricts non-school disclosure only to parents 
and to government agencies for "public health, safety,-law enforcement or na-
tional security" when pursuant to "law or court order." 161 The major exemption 
in the Delaware statute allows only for consensual disclosure of school records 
to potential employers and institutions of higher education.162 In sum, states 
have ,engrafted privacy onto FERPA where such privacy does not otherwise 
exist. 
FERP A has been instrumental in guiding state legislatures in enacting 
their own versions of education records privacy protections. Similarly, it has 
been instrumental in guiding state education departments in drafting privacy 
regulations. 
Rather than enact FERP A-like statutes, other states have formulated 
FERPA-like regulations. Although a complete rundown of all the regulations 
adopted by any particular state board of education is beyond the scope of this 
Article, school districts must be aware that such regulations exist as they too are 
enforceable in protecting student record privacy. School districts must be aware 
that these regulations might be fairly strict, such as in Massachusetts, where 
state regulations provide that no third party shall have ,access to information in 
or from student records without specific, informed written consent of the eligi-
ble student or parents .. 163 West Virginia has likewise been influenced by FERP A 
160 
161 
162 
• 
FLA. STAT.§ 1022.22(3)(d) (Supp. 2005). 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 41ll(a)(l) (1999). 
ld. § 4111 (a)(2). 
163 Commonwealth v. Buccella~ 751 N.E.2d 373, 380 (Mass. 2001); Commonwealth v. Nathan-
iel N., 764 N.E.2d '883, 888 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). In Nathaniel N., the court relied on 603 
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in one of its state education rules.164 In coordination with its statutory right to 
privacy, Pennsylvania's Department of Education regulations require that local 
school districts adopt FERPA-type rules concerning disclosure of and access to 
student records. 165 And New Jersey has a regulatory scheme that mirrors 
FERP A yet places on the local districts a great deal of responsibility for formu-
lating their own policies. 166 Even by regulatory regime, FERP A has influenced 
privacy policy at the state level. 
Many state legislatures have taken up the banner of student privacy and 
have done so by mimicking the intent and format of the federal FERPA to pro-
tect student records. In their various forms, these statutes and regulations pose 
challenges to school districts who may be more inclined to follow FERP A rather 
than more restrictive state statutes. Insofar as these state statutes are not ex-
pressly preempted by FERP A and a school district complies with FERP A when 
complying with a more restrictive state statute, there is no obstacle to prevent a 
district's following state statutes rather than FERP A. 167 This tack is especially 
MASS. CODE REGS. 23.07(4) (1995}, in detennining that a school did not unlawfully fail to provide 
juvenile defendant's school records to the police pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act. This Massachusetts regulation is a regulatory version of FERP A and a restrictive 
version it is: "no third party shall have access to infonnation in or from student records without 
specific, infonned written consent of the eligible student or parents." /d.; Nathaniel N., 764 
N.E.2d at 888. Indeed, the court gave greater force and effect to this state regulation than to 
IDEA's suggestion that special education records are to be sent to law enforcement authorities 
when special education students are involved. 
164 W.Va. Code. R. §§ 126-94-1 to 30 (2003). This State Board of Education Procedural Rule 
limit[s] collection and disclosure of infonnation relating to students which is 
individually identifiable, generally requiring consent of the parents for disclo-
sure and collection, except when collection is a normal part of the educational 
program. Disclosure requires consent of the parents, except when for release 
of directory information or in specific circumstances. Students and parents 
have the right to review such information, and procedures are established to 
amend the records when found to be inaccurate and to challenge disclosures 
which are in violation of the policy. 
State ex rei. Garden State Newspapers, Inc. v. Hoke, 520 S.E.2d 186, 194-95 (W. Va. 1999) (hold-
ing court did not exceed its power in sealing record of proceedings brought by juvenile against 
school district and its administrators because that record included educational records). 
165 22 PA. CODE§§ 12.31-.33 (2004); Bd. of Dirs. of Palmyra Area Sch. Dist. v. Palmyra Area 
Educ. Ass'n, 644 A.2d 267,270 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (teachers' union improperly used mailing 
list compiled of student names and addresses because not accessed for "legitimate educational 
interest"); Parents Against Abuse in Schs. v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 594 A.2d 796, 802-03 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (parents had right of access to school psychologist's notes from inter-
views he conducted of students who had suffered physical and mental abuse by a teacher). "The 
governing board of every school district, intermediate unit and area vocational-technical 
school shall adopt a plan for the collection, maintenance and dissemination of pupil 
records and submit the same to the Department for approval." 22 PA. CODE§ 12.31(a). 
166 N.J. ADMIN. CODE§ 6:3-6.1 (2004). 
167 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Supremacy Clause); 
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982). 
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important when the litigation stakes are higher under state law than under fed-
eral law. 
B. Access Only Statutes 
Several states only regulate access to student records. 168 Unlike the 
FERPA-type legislation and regulations, these legislatures apparently presumed 
the confidentiality of education records but felt compelled to legislate exemp-
tions to that implicit privacy by affirmatively allowing access. 
These statutes are reminiscent of FERPA but only address access to stu-
dentrecords and are in a small number of jurisdictions. Ohio's student records 
access statute looks like FERPA 'but it does not have the same content. Rather, 
it is an amalgam of limitations on access to student records. 169 Also rather 
FERPA-like are Virginia's170 and Nebraska's171 student records statutes. Instead 
of governing student privacy, they govern access to those records. 
More straightforward in their focus_ on access to student records are the 
statutes in Connecticut, Georgia~ Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and 
Texas. For example, Texas172 and Connectic_ut173 merely establish a parent's 
right to access his or her child's education records. Similarly limited is Geor-
gia's treatment of student records: "No local school system . . . shall have a 
policy of denying . . . parents . . . the right to inspect and review the education 
records of their child ."174 The Rhode Island statute is limited to the rights of 
parents, legal guardians, and eligible students.175 Massachusetts's statutes man-
date that the state board of education create regulations for the "maintenance, 
retention, duplication, storage and periodic destruction" of student records, 17·6 
and also provides for specific access to parents, guardians and students over the 
age of eighteen. 177 And New Jersey.'s statute similarly mandates the state board 
of education to supply regulations that, among other things, will govern ac-
cess.178 . . 
168 
169 
170 
171 
See generally Leiter, supra note 138. 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3319.321 (2004). 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-287 (2001). 
NEB. REV. STAT., § 79-2,104 (2003).; 
172 TEx. Eouc. CoDE ANN.§ 26.004 (Vernon 1996) .. These parental rights also seem to extend 
to what might otherwise be covered by privilege, like counseling and psychological records. 
173 CONN~ GEN. STAT.§ 10-15b (2002). 
174 GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2~ 720 (2005). 
175 R.I. GEN. LAWS §16-71-3 (2001). 
176 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 340 (2002)._ The Massachusetts_ Board of Education has, in-
deed, implemented rigorous regulations pursuant to this statute. See supra note 163. 
117 /d. § 34E. 
178 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 18A:36-19 (West 1999). 
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What one takes from these access statutes is the feeling that the states 
presume privacy of these records and will open them only to limited disclosure. 
It is unclear if the express provision of access to some means the implicit denial 
of access to others. If so, then these states actually will recognize an enforce-
able right to privacy. However, logic suggests that the very limits of the access 
to student records to parents and/or students as set out in some of the statutes 
might, perforce, limit access by all others. 179 
C. Special Education Records 
Special education records in all states have privacy coverage under the 
regulations that must be adopted under the Individuals with Disabilities Act 
("IDEA"). 180 Just as some states have adopted miniature versions of FERP A to 
protect the privacy of education records, so to have all states adopted similar 
versions of the Department of Education's regulations for special education .. 181 
The IDEA requires that the states conform to its statutory mandates and adopt 
regulations similar to those formulated by the Department of Education in ex-
change for partial federal funding of education for children with disabilities. 182 
Among those state-crafted regulations must be provisions protecting the school 
records of qualifying students under the Act. 183 As a consequence, under any 
state regime for the protection of student records, special education records are 
universally and unequivocally protected private inforn1ation by state regulation 
rather than by statute. Generally, such regulations must provide for notice and 
access to parents concerning these records.184 Two notably distinct protections 
cover special education students' files under these regulations: nonconsensual 
disclosures of student information may only be for compliance with and provi-
sion of services under IDEA;185 and school districts must have an individual 
designated to maintain the confidentiality of these files. 186 Thus, as mandated 
by IDEA, states afford greater privacy rights to special education students than 
to general education students. 
179 
"Expressio unius est exclusion alterius." This rule of statutory construction stands for the 
principle that when a legislative body expressly enumerates items in a statute, then others not so 
enumerated are presumed excluded. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 29 (2001). 
180 20 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); 34 C.P.R. § 300.127 (2004). 
181 20 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see generally Peter Walker & Sara Jane Steinberg, Confidentiality of 
Educational Records: Serious Risks for Parents and School Districts, 26 J.L. & Eouc. 11 (1997). 
182 20 U.S.C. § 1407. 
183 
''The State must have on file in detail the policies and procedures that the State has under-
taken to ensure protection of the confidentiality of any personally identifiable inforrrtation, col-
lected, used, or maintained .... " 34 C.F.R. § 300.127 (2004). 
184 34 C.P.R. §§ 300.560-300.577. 
185 See 34 C.F.R. §300.572(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.500(b)(3); 34 C.P.R. § 300.571. 
186 34 C.F.R. § 300.572(b); Buckley/, supra note 132, at 646; see also Stuart, Lex-Praxis, su-
pra note 17. 
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At least three states, Alaska, New York, and Nevada, have also enacted 
specific state statutes that regulate access to and disclosure of special education 
student records. Alaska's statute places access and disclosure matters up to the 
parents. 187 New York requires that the state department of education write regu-
lations governing privacy of special education records. 188 A bit more generally, 
Nevada has incorporated the IDEA and its regulations into its automated infor-
mation system. 189 Other than those three states, the rest seem to be resting on 
the protections provided by their regulations patterned on those drafted by the 
Department of Education to cover their special education records under the 
IDEA. 
D. Reaping the Whirlwind: Enforcing Statutory Rights 
The affirmative enforceability of these state statutes and regulations is 
what will make them more valuable and clearly more powerful than FERP A. 
After Gonzaga University v. Doe, FERPA has virtually no life left for vindicat-
ing individual privacy rights. Thus, state statutes could become the new "club" 
for requiring school districts to honor the privacy of student records. Congress's 
power to govern the states through its spending powers (or its conm1erce pow-
ers) does not have similar parallels with the power that state legislatures have to 
regulate state citizens. 190 State courts are more likely to interpret their privacy 
statutes to include personal rights than to be diluted as mere funding statutes. 
Consequently, enforcing personal privacy rights pursuant to state statutes 
through a private right of action may be significantly easier under state than 
under federal statutes, at least so long as the legislature intended to create some 
right to be vindicated by litigation. 191 
• 
187 ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.272(a)(8) (2004): "A school district shall infonn the parent of a 
child with a disability of the right ... to give consent or deny access to others to the child's educa-
tional record." Perhaps this statute would not be so broadly interpreted, but the plain meaning of 
the statute indicates that there is no place for nonconsensual disclosure of these records, even to 
educational personnel. 
188 The charge to the state department is 
[t]o make provision by regulation of the commissioner to assure the confiden-
tiality of any personally identifiable data, inforntation, and records collected 
or maintained ·by the state department of education or any school district, in-
cluding a committee or subcommittee on special education, and the officers, 
employees or members thereof, pursuant to or in furtherance of the purposes 
of this article, and shall establish procedures upon which any such personally 
identifiable data, information, or records may be disclosed. 
N.Y. Educ. Law § 4403(9) (McKinney 2001 ). 
189 NEV. REv. STAT. 386.655(2) (2003). The statute also incorporates "any other applicable 
federal Ia w." 
190 See generally Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002). 
191 Such intent can be detennined as follows: When " 'it appears that the duty imposed [by 
statute] is ... for the benefit of particular individuals or classes of individuals, a private right of 
action arises for injury sustained by reason of the breach, by any person the statute was designed 
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A school district might argue that there exists no such private right of 
action inuring to these statutes except in instances_ where a specific right exists 
in the statute, as in Florida, 192 or where a specific cause of action exists, as in 
lllinois.193 However, those fine points did not even come up in the handful of 
cases that school districts, students, and others have used to protect or gain ac-
cess to stude_nt records. Most of such cases have been access cases in which 
someone other than the statutorily designated individuals wanted access to the 
records.194 One can conclude that these statutes' enforcement for access pur:.. 
poses indicates the courts' willingness to vindicate individual rights under these 
statutes, thereby assuring that all other privacy rights likewise would be vindi-
cated. 
Florida,-which has the strictest student privacy protections, has also had 
the most reported litigation in this area. For instance, one court granted Florida 
State University's motion to quash a subpoena requesting the production of 
formal orders in student conduct code cases. Even though the subpoena allowed 
for the redaction of identifying inforn1ation, the Florida Court of Appeals de-
termined that these formal orders were confidential records and reports. Be-
cause Florida's privacy statutes made no provision for partial disclosure of such 
records and reports, the proposed redaction would still not fulfill the legal re-
strictions on disclosure. 195 Florida's statutory restrictions were intended to pro-
to protect, provided the injury sustained by him is a special injury different from that inflicted on 
the general public, and has resulted proximately from and because of the violation."' Bartholo-
mew County Beverage Co. v. Barco Beverage Corp., 524 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). 
The primary considerations for examining legislative intent to create a private right of action are 
the creation of a benefited class, the promotion of a legislative purpose by a private right ofaction, 
and consistency with the statutory scheme. E.g., Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 
18, 20 (N.Y. 1989).- A cause of action may be implied even without the provision of an express 
remedy. E.g., Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1982). See 
generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877 
(2003). 
192 ~'[S]tudents and their parents shall have rights of access, rights of challenge, and rights of 
privacy with respect to such records and reports .. . . '' FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(1) (2004). 
193 
"Any person injured by a willful or negligent violation of this Act [Illinois School Student 
Records Act] may institute an action for damages in the Circuit Court of the County in which the 
violation has occurred or the Circuit Court of the County in which the school is located. 105 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 10/9(b) (1998 & S'upp. 2005); see also 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9(a); John K. v. Bd. of 
Educ. for Sch. Dist. No. 65, 504 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (parents entitled to injunctive 
relief to gain access to student records). 
194 Access cases might be otherwise litigated under the applicable state open records law. 
However, these were actually pursued under the affirmative privacy statutes. 
195 Fla. State Univ. v. Hatton! 672 So. 2d 576, 578-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (relying on 
FLA. STAT. § 228.093(3)(d) now FLA. STAT. § 1002.22.) Similarly, University of Florida's honor 
court proceedings are not "public meetings" because discussion therein might include confidential 
student records. Marston v. Gainesville Sun Pub I' g Co., 341 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976). 
• 
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vide affirrnative confidentiality to student records196 and not just to exempt them 
from public disclosure in certain circumstances. Indeed, Florida prides itself on 
providing greater protections than FERPA.197 
Other state court cases involve the partial protection of student records 
by limiting access only to student information that is masked or not personally 
identifiable. 198 Those courts generally treated student records statutes as making 
records absolutely confidential from public disclosure unless the request was for 
solely statistical inforrnation. 199 Regardless of the parties involved, school dis-
tricts should recognize that litigation and privately enforceable rights are inher-
ent in these privacy statutes. Thus, these statutes bring greater risks to school 
districts in tertns of inu11ediate outlays for attorney fees (and perhaps damages) 
than do federal laws purporting to protect student records. 
V. SUNSHINE LAWS PROTECTING STUDENT RECORDS 
A. The Protection 
Often, the matter of student record privacy arises when the school dis-
trict is being held accountable by a member of the public requesting information 
under a state open records law. Hence, one might consider it unusual to find 
protection for student records in these laws. Open records laws accommodate 
the concept that govert1111ents must be accountable to their citizens and that gov-
ernment agencies should be "transparent" for public oversight.200 Therefore, the 
public may access many records held by the government. However, student 
records are often exempted from such access. 
196 See, e.g., Johnson v. Deluz, 875 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004). In Johnson v. Deluz, the 
Florida Court of Appeals detennined that, even though teachers might usually be considered a 
party with access to confidential student information, that right had limits. /d. Consequently, a 
school board had to redact all identifying student infonnation from an investigative report con-
cerning a principal when teachers requested a copy of that report. /d. 
197 WFfV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), review 
denied, 892 So. 2d 1 015 (Fla. 2004) (TV station could not access redacted Transportation Student 
Discipline Forms or surveillance videotapes). 
198 See, e.g., Bowie v. Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65, 538 N.E.2d 557, 559-60 (Ill. 
1989) (Illinois Student Records Act does not protect information by which no individual student 
may be identified); Human Rights Auth. of Ill. Guardianship & Advocacy Comm'n v. Miller, 464 
N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Disclosure of testing and statistical information is clearly at 
the forefront of so-called school reform efforts and accountability movements. Unfortunately, the 
scope of this Article is not intended to travel in that territory. 
199 See, e.g., Hardin County Schs. v. Foster, 40 S.W.3d 865, 868-69 (Ky. 2001) (statistical 
disciplinary data that does not contain personally identifiable student infonnation is not confiden-
tial under student records act); see also Fish v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 31 S.W.3d 678, 681-83 
(Tex. App. 2000) (court relied, in part, on state statute that protected student records as confiden-
tial in considering whether or not to allow disclosure of testing information identified by test 
number, gender, age and ethnicity). 
200 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 
86 MINN. L. REv. 1137, 1173 (2002). 
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Each state legislature has enacted an open records statute,201 also called 
"freedom of inforntation" acts, "open access" acts, and "sunshine'' laws. 202 
What these statutes do is assure access to public information so that govern-
ments do not operate in secret.203 However, not all public records are subject to 
disclosure; no sunshine law mandates "absolute disclosure."204 Instead, there 
are exemptions from disclosure for those public records that the le.gislature 
deems of such a nature- usually having a "privacy" interest- to which the pub-
lic should not be privy. One category of information to which this exempting 
method of "privacy protection" applies is student records. 
Of course, this category of exemption within a sunshine law assumes 
student records are actually public records.205 That is not always true. North 
Carolina has enacted a statute that specifically states that student records are 
simply not public records at all: ''The official record of each student is not a 
public record as the tertn 'public record' is defined by [the public records act]. 
The official record shall not be subject to inspection and examination as author-
ized by [the public records act].''206 Other state legislatures have implied a simi-
lar result by enacting separate privacy statutes for student records, making them 
"confidential" and therefore not subject to disclosure. As discussed above, a 
state with a comprehensive student records act usually considers those records 
outside the purview of the open records acts. Florida's education records pri-
vacy statute207 is such an example as is lllinois's School Records Act.208 In-
deed, student records in Florida are affirmatively confidential, not negatively 
201 Kristen M. Blankley, Are Public Records too Public? Why Personally Identifying Informa-
tion Should Be Removed from Both Online and Print Versions of Court Documents, 65 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 413, 428 n.68 (2004).); Case Comment, Open Records- Agencies or Custodians Affected: 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Expands the Scope of North Dakota's Open Records Law, 75 
N.D. L. REv. 745, 749 n.25 (1996). 
202 
203 
204 
Solove, supra note 200, at 1160-61. 
/d. 
ld. at 1162. 
205 In a related article, I opine that student records are not public records at all: they belong to 
the students and their parents and the school is the government keeper. See generally Stuart, Lex-
Praxis, supra note 17. These aren't records that the government must keep as a government 
agency; they are records the government keeps in order to better educate. This function also 
makes them distinct from employee personnel records kept by government agencies that have a 
direct impact on the working of the agency. Instead, student records have virtually nothing to do 
with the administration of the government function of the school, apart from statistical informa-
tion required to be kept when the school is acting as a governmental agency~ 
206 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-402(e) (2003); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1 (2003) 
(higher education student records are not "government records" in New Jersey). 
207 FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(3)(d) (2004). 
208 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 (1998 & Supp. 2005); see also Bowie v. Evanston Cmty. Consol. 
Sch. Dist .. No. 65, 538 N.E.2d 557, 559-60 (Ill. 1989). 
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exempted from disclosure.209 Likewise, student records have specific confiden-
tiality in Wisconsin210 and in Kentucky.211 
Many state sunshine laws themselves, howe,ver, impliedly regard stu-
dent records as public records but exte.nd them a modicum of privacy protection 
through the traditional means of listing them as specific exemptions from public 
disclosure. For instance, Colorado exempts addresses and telephone numbers of 
public school students212 and "scholastic achievement data on individual 
persons"213 while one of Iowa's exemptions keeps confidential the following 
public records: "[p]ersonal information in records regarding a student, prospec-
tive student, or fortner student maintained, created, collected or assembled .by 
or for a school corporation or educational institution maintaining such re-
cords."214 Similar ~rotectio?s exist in New .Ham~shire,215 Okl~o~a/16 Ver-
mont,217 Tennessee, 18 Washtngton,219 and Wtsconstn.220 Wyotrung tn a nod to 
its Old West roots, exempts nearly everything under its public records act in 
"[s]chool district records containing information relating to the biography, fam-
ily, physiology, religion, academic achievement and physical or mental ability 
209 See, e.g., WFfV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. .App. 2004), 
review denied, 892 So. 2d 10 I 5 (Fla. 2004 ). 
210 WIS. STAT. § 118.125(2) (2004) ("All pupil records maintained by a public school shall be 
confidential, except as provided [herein].''). However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has inter .. 
preted this provision as an exemption to the state public records act. Hathaway v~ Joint. Sch. Dist. 
No. I, City of Green Bay, 342 N.W.2d 682, 687-88 (Wis. 1984). 
211 
"Education records of students in the public educational institutions in this state are deemed 
confidential and shall· not be disclosed, or the contents released, except under the circumstances 
described in [this Act].t' KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 160.705(1) (West 1999). The Kentucky Supreme 
Court too views this provision as an exemption to the state's open records act rather than an af-
firrnati ve statement by the legislature that these are not public records. Hardin County Schs. v"' 
Foster, 40 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Ky. 2001 ). That interpretation is a bit difficult to fathom given the 
plain meaning of the statutory language. 
212 Cow-. REv. STAT.§ 24-72-204(3)(a)(VI) (2004). 
213 Cow-. REv. STAT § 24-72-204(3)(a)(l); Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33J v. W. Servs., Inc., 
751 P .2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1988). 
214 IOWA CODE§ 22.7(1) (2001). 
215 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 91-A;4 (2001); Brent v. Paquette, 567 A.2d 976,983 (N.H. 1989). 
216 OkLA STAT. tit 51, § 24A.l6 (2000). In Oklahoma; student records are kept "confidential" 
along with ''teacher lesson plans, test and other teaching material" and "personal communications. 
concerning individual students." /d. 
217 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1~ § 317 (1996). 
218 TENN. CODE ANN.§ 10-7-504(a)(4) (1999). 
219 WASH. REv. CODE§ 42.17.310 (2000). 
220 Wisconsin's open records act exclusions have been interpreted to specifically incorporate 
the pupil confidentiality statutes. WIS. STAT.§ 19.36(1) (2003); WIS. STAT.§ 118.125(2); State ex 
rel. Blum v. Bd. ofEduc. Sch. Dist. of Johnson Creek, 565 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) 
(ruling that interim pupil grades are pupil records exempt from disclosure in a student dispute over 
GPAs and scholarship selection). 
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of any student except to the person in interest or to the officials duly elected and 
appointed to supervise him~"221 
Other states' exemptions are a bit more convoluted, and even repetitive 
of other statutes, by carving out parts of records as being exempt or by incorpo-
rating FERPA's exemptions within their sunshine laws. As a backup to its 
School Student Records Act, lllinois's freedom of information act exempts 
"files and personal infortnation maintained with respect to ... students .... "222 
Maryland, on the other ·hand, includes its school records protections among the 
specifically denominated exemptions to its public records act.223 Similarly, 
Michigan224 and Arkansas225 expressly incorporate FERP A as an exemption to 
their sunshine laws. Texas exempts "in conformity with" FERPA.226 Others 
"protect'' student record privacy because the legislature exempts from disclosure 
those records that are protected by federal law, like FERPA227 and the IDEA, 
either specifically or generally?28 
Other states more broadly offer protections by generally incorporating 
applicable_ state_ laws,229 such as Oregon, which exempts ''[s]tudent records re-
quired by state or federal law to be exempt from disclosure/'230 Similarly, Vir-
ginia protects scholastic records from disclos-ure when ''prohibited by law.''231 
221 Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 16-4-203(d)(viii) (2005). 
222 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/?(l)(b)(i) (1988 & Supp. 2005); see also Chicago Tribune Co. v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 773 N.E.2d 674~ 682 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (school board properly denied 
reporter's FOIA request concerning personal information of over one million students; including 
information about school, room number, medical status, special education status, race, lunch 
status, grade point average, date of birth, and standardized test scores). 
223 Mo. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § l0-616(k) (LexisNexis 2004); see also Kirwan v. The 
Diamondback, 721 A.2d 196, 203 (Md. 1998) (stating in dictum that FERPA is federal law that 
would exempt records from disclosure). 
224 MICH. COMP. LAws § 15.243( 1 )(t)(2) (200 1 ); see generally Connoisseur Communication of 
Flintt L.P. v. Univ. of Mich., 584 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
225 ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(2) (Michie 2002) (stating that the Arkansas act exempts 
"education records as defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ... 
unless their disclosure is consistent with the provisions of that act .... "). See also .Ark. Gazette 
Co. v. S. State Coli., 620 S.W.2d 258 (Ark. 1981). 
226 TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.026 (2004). 
227 But see generally Or. County R-IV Sch. Dist. v. LeMon, 739 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1987). In a rather convoluted opinion, the Missouri Court of Appeals detennined that stu-
dent names, addresses and telephones were not exempt from disclosure under the state's sunshine 
law, even though there is an exemption "as otherwise provided by law" and FERPA did not qual-
ify as such law prohibiting disclosure because this infonnation otherwise fit within disclosable 
"d" . &. .. - • '') trectory tn.ormatton . . ·. 
228 See Tamu K._ Walton; Protecting Student Privacy: Reporting Campus Crimes as an Alter-
native to Disclosing Student Disciplinary Records, 771ND. L.J. 143, 153 n.78 (2002). 
229 /d. at 153-54 n.79. 
230 OR. REV. STAT. § 192.496(4) (2003). 
231 VA. CODE ANN~ § 2.2-3705.4 (2001 ). Virginia's exemption also provides access for parents 
but other access may be prohibited upon request by any parent for students under eighteen. 
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New York allows public agencies to exempt records from disclosure if ex-
empted under state or federallaw.232 One California court has interpreted such 
general protections to cover student records even though California's Public 
Records Act would have require_d disclosure of student disciplinary records be-
cause that Act also has an exemption pursuant to federal law.233 The court de-
tertnined that, because FERP A included student disciplinary records as educa-
tional records under its protection, those disciplinary records were not subject to 
disclosure.234 Indiana similarly forbids public disclosure of student records be-
cause of its sunshine law's incorporation of federal law exemptions. 235 In sum-
mary, sunshine laws- the antithesis of privacy- provide some of the most spe-
cific protections for student records. 
One odd exemption is in Michigan, where the public records act offers 
more general protection against disclosures that are considered to be unwar-
ranted invasions of privacy.236 In Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University,231 
the court of appeals determined that exemption applied to a magnetic tape that a 
state university used to produce a student directory. The court averred that the 
state's freedom of infonttation act was not designed to honor a request to de· 
velop mailing lists for political purposes when it sought disclosure of student 
information given to the university for a completely different purpose?38 In 
reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the similar exemption and rationale 
underlying the federal Freedom of Infortnation Act, that disclosure is prohibited 
if it constitutes an invasion of privacy.239 If state sunshine laws are interpreted 
232 N.Y. Pus. OFF. LAw§ 87 (McKinney 2001); see also Kryston v. Bd. of Educ., E. Ramapo 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (FERPA is one of those statutes 
that would fit within the statutory exemption). 
233 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6250 (West 2002); Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 
129 Cal Rptr. 2d 11, 12;..15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
234 Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Cal Rptr. 2d at 15; accord Osborn v. Bd. of Re-
gents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 647 N.W.2d 158, 170 (Wis. 2002) (race and gender statistical data 
derived from university admissions application is accessible by researcher who is not otherwise 
seeking personally identifiable infonnation protected by FERPA, Wis. STAT. § 19.35(1)(9) 
(2003)). 
235 IND. CODE§ 5-14-3-4 (2001); Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind. Newspapers v. Trs. of 
Ind. Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
236 MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 15.243(13)(1)(a) (2001). 
237 294 N.W.2d228, 234-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), affd, 327 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. 1982). 
238 /d. at 236; see also Brent v. Paquette, 567 A.2d 976, 983-84 (N.H. 1989) (students' and 
parents' names and addresses exempt from disclosure under state's Right-to-Know statute's ex-
emption against disclosure of infonnation that would constitute an invasion of privacy). 
239 Kestenbaum, 294 N.W.2d at 233. FOIA even has express language in it that prohibits ac-
cess to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.,' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000). Additional lan-
guage protects information that ''could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted inva-
sion of person privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see generally Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding 
Private Lives from prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict between Constitutional Privacy and the 
Accountability Principle of Democracy, 11 COMMLAW CoNSPECTUS 71 (2003). 
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as impliedly shielding certain information in order to prevent an invasion of 
privacy, these statutes may protect an even broader range of inforrnation than 
just their specifically enumerated exemptions. Even if student records are not 
specifically exempted, they would be impliedly exempted under the public's 
reasonable expectation to be free of unwarranted invasions of privacy. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court recently expanded FOIA'' s protection to prohibit disclosure 
of death-scene photographs that would have invaded the privacy of surviving 
family members .. 240 Hence, the breadth of protection under sunshine laws may 
not be confined to specifically enumerated prohibitions but may cover student 
records under a much broader range of protection. This opens the -door to ex-
panded use of the courts by students and their parents. 
B. The Litigation 
School districts are- or should be- aware of the dangers involved in 
public record requests. Accessing any statutory annotation for any sunshine law 
will likely yield reported litig_ation, usually because the government has refused 
access.241 Refusal is often the correct response, but that does not stop the re-
quester from pursuing a lawsuit. Thus, sometimes the public's request for ac-
cess to school information presents a school district with a no--win situ':ltion. To 
that extent, sunshine laws are fraught with more litigation dangers than federal 
privacy laws. On the other hand, although the exposure exists, it is somewhat 
less exposure to student-initiated litigation. 
The genesis of any student-initiated litigation for release of infortnation 
under sunshine laws is the inherent clash between the purpose of those laws for 
government accountability and the individual citizen's sense that some govern-
ment records are too private for public disclosure. Courts for nearly a century 
have recognized this ''sense'' by formulating remedies for common law invasion 
of torts,242 frrst elucidated in the well-known and oft-cited 1890 Harvard Law 
Review article, The Right to Privacy.243 The privacy tort most often used for the 
240 Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004), reh'g denied, 541 
u.s. 1057 (2004). 
241 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
242 The four major invasion of privacy torts are found at REsTATEMENT (SECONt>) OF TORTS § 
652(A) ( 1977): 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another ... ; or 
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness ... ; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life ... ; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably placed the other in a false light before the 
public .... 
243 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy [The implicit made explicit], 
4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 75 
(Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed. 1984 ). 
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unauthorized release of information is the civil wrong of making private facts 
public.244 Courts have. incorporated these tort concepts. into the analyses of 
whether or not to release information under sunshine laws.245 To the extent 
these sunshine laws are in derogation of the common law right of privacy, they 
might fairly be restricted and applied narrowly.246 
However, independent tort actions against government agencies solely 
for recovery under the tort are few and far between and will rarely be successful 
for wrongful disclosure of private information held by the government because 
of the heavy burden on a plaintiff~247 Such actions are made difficult because 
the tort usually requires proof that the publicized inforn1ation was not actually a 
matter of public concem.248 The only school records case involving the tort was 
not successful. In Louisiana, a school board member obtained and forwarded a 
student's records to the state department of education for an investigation into 
allegations of grade-changing. 249 The court determined that those actions did 
not constitute an invasion of privacy because there was no violation of the stu-
dent's expectation of privacy nor .an improper public disclosure.250 
All this is not to suggest that the invasion of privacy tort may not prove 
useful in these situations. There are a handful of cases by which individuals 
have sued private individuals- as opposed to governmental entities...._ and sue-
244 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6520 (1977): "One who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, 
if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." But see Nat' I Archives & Records Admin. v. Fav-
ish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004), reh'g denied~ 541 U.S. 1057 (2004) (holding that photographs of 
deceased would constitute an intrusion into the privacy of the family). 
245 See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167-70 (2004), reh'g 
denied 541 U.S. 1057 (2004); Dept. of Children v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 710 A.2d 1378, 
1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Seattle Firefighters v. Hollister, 737 P.2d 130.2, 1305 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1987)); accord O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1989); Doe v. 
Unified Sch. Dist., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Kan. 2003). 
246 See Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 686 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (contrasting privacy 
statute and common law right to privacy); Williams v. Matthews; 448 S.E.2d 625, 628 (Va. 1994) 
(statute authorizing seizure of property in derogation of right to privacy). See generally Edmund-
son v. Rivera, 363 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Conn. 1975); Summers v. Suinmers, 239 N.E.2d 795, 798 
(Ill. 1968); Rusinek v. Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co., 309 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Mich. 1981). 
247 See, e.g., Rocque v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 774 A.2d 957,962-63 (Conn. 2001). 
248 See, e.g., Hatch v. Town of Middletown, 311 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2002); Dept. of Children 
v~ Freedom of Info. Co·mm'n, 710 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). This may well be a 
recognition that access to government records also has common law underpinnings. See, e._g., 
Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers, 
711 A.2d 1131, 1135 (R.I. 1998). 
249 Young v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd., 673 So. 2d 1272, 1275-76 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
250 Young, 6"73 So. 2d at 1275-76; see also Doe v. Unified Sch. Dist., 255 F.Supp.2d 1239, 
1249-50 (D. Kan. 2003) (school board member's disclosure of information to a single person did 
not constitute publicity for privacy tort); accord Williamson ex rel. Williamson v. Keith, 786 So. 
2d 390, 396 (Miss. 2003) (school board lawyer not liable for invasion of privacy for subpoenaing 
special education records because there was no publicity). 
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ceeded in proving unlawful disclosure of private information.251 Under the cir-
cumstances, the risk of tort litigation under sunshine laws is pretty minimal, 
given the large number of cases that do not succeed.252 However, school offi-
cials do risk some hartn from suc·h tort suits even if the plaintiff is unsuccessful, 
especially if the suit is instituted against a school official as a private individual 
rather than as a public official, even if only in costs and attorney fees. 
In the main, sunshine laws have proved effective in protecting student 
records. and private information therein on explicit statutory terms. Courts have 
usually been assiduous in preventing access to personal information in school 
records under sunshine laws. Courts have eve.n gone so far as to engraft tort 
notions of privacy in a broader sense to cast a greater protective shadow over 
school records. Regardless of the minimal success of the tort itself in matters of 
records, the sunshine laws on their own terms have proved successful in provid-
ing protection, especially more successful than federal laws . 
• 
VI. CONCLUSION 
School districts ignore their state constitutions, state statutes, and state 
regulations governing the privacy of student records at their periL It is easy and 
comfortable to follow the federal statutes and regulations and assume they fol-
low the same principles and provide the same protection as state law. They do 
not. In many cases, the federal laws conflict with state laws. When the state 
laws afford greater rights than the federal laws, the school districts run the seri-
ous risk of entangling_ themselves in disputes not anticipated by the guidance 
and policies formulated by the United States Department of Education. Most 
state laws are more restrictive about privacy protections than the federal laws 
and have more likelihood of creating litigation problems than federal laws. 
The use of state laws to vindicate civil rights in other areas of the law is 
beginning to affect the particular vindication of privacy rights. School districts 
are familiar with privacy protections under federal law, but not as familiar with 
their respective state laws. Although school districts are often the bulwark for 
preventing public access under sunshine laws, they must also be attentive to the 
more particularized details of state laws. This ~'brave new world" of state litiga-
tion is destined to expand as litigants abandon federal remedies for state reme-
dies. This "brave new world" makes familiarity with the "local distinction" of 
state privacy laws imperative. 
251 E.g., Hill v. MCI World-Com Commc'ns, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1205, l2l3-15 (S.D. Iowa 
2001); Pachowitz v. LeDoux, 666 N.W.2d 88, 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003), review denied, 671 
N.W.2d 849 (Wis. 2003). But see Olson v. Red Cedar Clinic, 681 N.W.2d 306, 308-10 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2004), review denied, 687 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2004) (clinic's transmission of medical records 
to school psychologist was not an invasion of privacy under Wisconsin statute because there was 
no public disclosure). 
252 See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §. 6520 ( 1977) (appendices). 
